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UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS IN A
STOCHASTIC MODEL OF THE MARRIAGE MARKET
COLIN DECKER, ELLIOTT H. LIEB, ROBERT J. MCCANN, AND BENJAMIN K. STEPHENS
Abstract. Choo-Siow (2006) proposed a model for the marriage market which allows for
random identically distributed noise in the preferences of each of the participants. The
randomness is McFadden-type, which permits an explicit resolution of the equilibrium
preference probabilities.
The purpose of this note is to prove uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium marriage
distribution, and find a representation of it in closed form. This allows us to derive smooth
dependence of this distribution on exogenous preference and population parameters, and
establish sign, symmetry, and size of the various substitution effects, facilitating compar-
ative statics. For example, we show that an increase in the population of men of any given
type in this model leads to an increase in single men of each type, and a decrease in single
women of each type. We show that an increase in the number of men of a given type
increases the equilibrium transfer paid by such men to their spouses, and also increases
the percentage of men of that type who choose to remain unmarried. While the above
trends may not seem surprising, the verification of such properties helps to substanti-
ate the validity of the model. Moreover, we make unexpected predictions which could be
tested: namely, the percentage change of type i unmarrieds with respect to fluctuations in
the total number of type j men or women turns out to form a symmetric positive-definite
matrix rij = rji in this model, and thus to satisfy bounds such as |rij | ≤ (riirjj)
1/2.
Along the way, we give a new proof for the existence of an equilibrium, based on
a strictly convex variational principle and a simple estimate, rather than a fixed point
theorem. Fixed point approaches to the existence part of our result have been explored
by others [6] [8] [12], but are much more complicated and yield neither uniqueness, nor
comparative statics, nor an explicit representation of the solution.
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1. Introduction
The classic transferable utility framework which Becker used to model the marriage mar-
ket was augmented by Choo and Siow [7] to allow for the possibility that agents’ preferences
might be only partly determined by observable characteristics, and might therefore include
a stochastic component depending on unobservable characteristics. The randomness was
chosen to be McFadden type [19], and spreads the preferences of agents on one side of
the marriage market over the entire type-distribution of agents on the other, thus yielding
non-assortative matching, a feature of the marriage market that has long been observed
empirically [7]. The model is non-parametric and highly tractable; given an observation of
marriages between different types of agents, there is a simple closed form, ‘point-identified’
expression for the average utility (or ‘total gains’) generated by each type of marriage. Of
use to econometricians, demographers, and economic theorists is a solution to the back-
wards problem: given the total gains to each type of marriage and population data, what
can be said about possible distributions of marriages corresponding to those parameters?
Basic questions include existence and uniqueness of such a marital distribution; computing
comparative statics is even more interesting. How will the marital distribution respond to
changes in composition of the population? How will it change due to policy shocks whose
effects can be summarized by revising the total gains parameters? The purpose of the
present note is to address these questions.
A priori, it is not evident whether each choice of gains parameters leads to the existence
of a distribution of marriages which clears the market [6] [12] [8]. Although it is not the
main point of our paper, we begin by reconfirming that it does. We then go on to show this
equilibrium is unique, and give an explicit formula for the resulting marriage distribution,
essentially solving the model completely. This allows us to derive smooth dependence
of the resulting equilibrium state on the specified population and preference parameters,
and establish sign, symmetry and bounds on the response of the predicted distribution of
marriages to changes in each parameter. Although existence of an equilibrium was also
discussed by Choo, Seitz and Siow [6] and Fox [12] (and by Dagsvik [8] for a related model),
our proof relies on the reformulation of the problem as a variational minimization, hence is
simpler than the fixed point argument they suggest. More importantly, it yields the solution
in closed form. Our uniqueness result is the first concerning this model [5], and is based on
convexity (in appropriate variables) of the new variational principle formulated in Section
§5. The variational technique we use is powerful, because it characterizes the endogenous
variables of interest as the critical points of a function. Indeed, the competitive equilibrium
in this model turns out to be realized as the minimum of a strictly convex function (given
in Theorem 1 below), facilitating its subsequent analysis.
1.1. Organization. The remainder of this introduction provides further motivation and
background for the Choo-Siow model. Section §2 details the model and could be skipped
by readers familiar with the Choo-Siow model, except that it ends with a summary placing
our results in the context of related literature. Further comments concerning the derivation
of the model may be found in Appendix A. Section §3 states our results formally; it is
followed by a section containing derived statics and one further conjecture. Section §5
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proves the existence and uniqueness of equilibria, while §6 is devoted to the comparative
statics established in Theorem 2. Section §7 establishes the further comparative static
assertions of Corollary 3 and §4.
1.2. Further remarks. The random component of agent preferences is a salient feature
of the Choo-Siow model. Due to this randomness, the equilibrium marriage distribution
predicted by the model will not be positive assortative, even when the observed attributes of
the agents are one-dimensional. This is consistent with empirical data. Even in experiments
where the agents are parameterized by ordered types, such as age, observed marital data
will almost never be genuinely assortative. For example, in any given population it is
unlikely to be true that the age of the youngest woman married to a 34 year old man
always exceeds that of the oldest woman married to a 33 year old. Similarly, one always
finds matches in large populations that pair high with low qualities as measured by any
given ordered observable characteristic (e.g. income, years of education, etc.). Thus a
strictly assortative framework fails to explain the presence of, for example, the existence
of PhD graduates married to high-school drop-outs.
The classic transferable utility model of the marriage market, introduced by Gary Becker
[1], in principle predicts how agents will marry given exogenous preference parameters.
However, it has seldom been estimated. There are two main obstacles to estimating a model
of the marriage market. First, equilibrium transfers in modern marriages (except in the case
of dowries) are not observed. Hence any behavioural model that requires their presence
in data is not identifiable. Second, real-world agents are described by discrete, multi-
dimensional, possibly unordered, types. But the classic Becker model predicts positive
assortative matching under the assumption that agent type is one dimensional, continuous,
ordered, and that preferences are super-modular. This positive assortative matching is
limiting, but does ensure that his model predicts a unique marital distribution.
The Choo-Siow model eliminates the structural assumptions of the classic model. First,
it is not necessary to observe transfers in order to determine the equilibrium marriage
distribution generated by the model. In fact, we provide an explicit formula for the equi-
librium marriage distribution in terms of the derivative of the Legendre transform of a
known function. Second, the model places no a priori structure on the nature or number
of types that agents (men and women) can have. This allows consideration of a wide range
of attributes, like race, religion, level of income, and educational achievements.
In this more realistic framework, with its lack of structure for the agents’ deterministic
preferences and types, the issue of whether there exists an equilibrium marital distribu-
tion, and if so whether it is unique, becomes a question of fundamental theoretical and
econometric significance. The theoretical importance arises from the fact that uniqueness
of equilibria in two-sided matching problems is usually not better than a generic prop-
erty, except perhaps in certain convex programming settings like [10] [11], which include
continuous Monge-Kantorovich matching [16] [4]. Further, the randomness considered in
the model below is the commonly used extreme value logit type, thus any result that de-
scribes properties of the equilibrating matches has potentially wider applicability. The
econometric importance arises from the fact that models of the marriage market are useful
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to econometricians only insofar as they make unique predictions of a marital distribution,
given exogenous preferences. From a practical point of view having closed form solutions
which permit comparative statics may be even more crucial.
2. The Choo-Siow Marriage Matching Model
Our presentation emphasizes the stochastic heterogeneity that differentiates the Choo-
Siow model from classical models. The competitive framework, which uses transfers of
utility from spouses to equilibrate the market, is explored in detail in Choo-Siow [7] but
treated here only in §7. It should be noted at the outset that the methods developed here
also apply to other non-transferable utility models present in the literature. For example,
Dagsvik [8] develops a model of the marriage market which uses an assignment algorithm
(deferred acceptance) rather than utility transfers to sort matches, but his equilibrium
conditions are functionally similar to ours.
2.1. Setting. What is exogenous in this model are the observed types of men and of
women, the numbers of men and women of each type in the population, and the total
gains πij of marriage between a man of observed type i and a woman of observed type
j, relative to both partners remaining single. The quantity πij will not reappear until
(7). On the other hand, individual agents have a utility function that depends on both an
endogenous deterministic component that captures systematic utility, and an exogenous
random one that models heterogeneity within the population of each given type. Thus the
utility accrued by a man of type i and specific identity g who marries a woman of type j
is assumed to be:
(1) V mijg = η
m
ij + σǫijg;
the case j = 0 represents the utility of remaining single. The deterministic component is
ηmij ; its endogeneity can be interpreted to reflect the possibility of interspousal transfer, as
in Choo-Siow [7] and §7 below. It is set in equilibrium, and depends explicitly on the type
of the man and the type of the woman, and implicitly on market conditions, i.e. on the
relative abundance or scarcity of men and women of each different type. The random term
ǫijg depends additionally on the specific identity of the man, but not on the specific identity
of the woman. Hence a specific thirty-five year old man may have stronger than typical
(with respect to his age group) attraction for fifty-year old women. But this attraction does
not depend on whether, for example, the older woman has an especially strong attraction
to younger men (assuming this latter characteristic is unobservable in the data and hence
not reflected in j).
The random term is assumed to have the Gumbel extreme value distribution described
in Appendix A. This distribution was introduced to the economics literature by McFadden
[19]. It represents a severe simplifying assumption in our model, but has recently relaxed
in work by Galichon and Salanie´ [15] which allows heteroskedasticity, for example. Our
homoskedastic model admits only a single scaling parameter σ which measures the degree
of randomness; its reciprocal can be interpreted as the signal to noise ratio. It is equal to
unity in the original Choo-Siow model. For illustrative purposes, we will have occasion to
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allow σ to vary and in doing so embed the Choo-Siow model in a one parameter family of
models that differ by the degree of randomness present in them.
In contrast with deterministic matching models, agents of a particular type do not have a
uniform preferred match. This is because their preferences depend on the random variable
ǫijg. Using the Gumbel structure, the probability that a man of type i prefers a woman of
type j among all other possible marital choices k ∈ {0, ..., J} is given by
(2) Pr(Man of type (i, g) prefers a woman of type j) =
exp(
ηmij
σ )∑J
k=0 exp(
ηmik
σ )
;
(see Appendix A for a derivation). This probability distribution is endogenous, because
it depends on the various ηmik . Note that it does not depend on the specific identity g of
the man of type i, since the noise is identically distributed for each different g. Yet it is
possible already to see how the equilibrium marriage output will differ markedly from a
deterministic one. Whereas in the deterministic case all members of a given type typically
have the same preferred match, here the preferred matches of type i men are smeared
across all female types according to the distribution defined by (2). The mean and spread
of the smearing are determined by the endogenous values ηmij and by σ, respectively.
Consider σ ∈ [0,∞]. The case σ = 1 corresponds to the Choo-Siow model where some
smearing is present. The case σ = 0 corresponds to a deterministic matching model, for
which there is no smearing. Indeed, as σ → 0, the largest exponentials dominate all others,
and the probability that a man of type i prefers a woman of type j converges to 0 or
1
#argmax{ηmij |0≤j≤J}
depending on whether or not ηmij weakly dominates all other preference
parameters ηmik . Conversely, as σ →∞, the stochastic term dominates the utility function,
and the resulting probability distribution converges to the uniform distribution. In this
case, there is maximal smearing, as preferences are completely random, constrained only
by availability of prospective partners to marry.
Female preferences are also smeared, and the equilibrium marriage distribution is deter-
mined when ηmij and η
f
ij are such that the number of desired marriages of each type is the
same on both sides of the market.
We now elaborate on the Choo-Siow model. We henceforth fix σ = 1; since preferences
are relative, this normalization can always be attained by rescaling all of the preferences
in the model.
2.2. The Choo-Siow model. Suppose we wish to predict the number of marriages be-
tween men and women of different types. The number of men of type i is denoted mi. The
number of marriages of type i men to type j women is denoted µij. The number of type i
men (respectively type j women) who choose to remain single is denoted by µi0 (and µ0j
respectively). If each man marries his preferred woman, the equality
(3) Pr(Man of type (i, g) prefers a woman of type j) =
µij
mi
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will be valid, or at least as the population size becomes large, the right hand side of the
equality converges to the left hand side by the law of large numbers, or the maximum
likelihood theorem.
Using equations (2)–(3) to compute the ratio of the probability that a man of type i
prefers a woman of type j to the probability that he prefers to remain single, we arrive at
the following formula:
(4) µmij =
eη
m
ij
eη
m
i0
µmi0 .
These I×J equations are in fact quasi-demand equations, because they indicate the number
of type µij marriages that men of type i would like to participate in. Viewing the female
market cohort as the supply side, there are analogous supply equations. Letting the utility
acquired by a woman of type j and specific identity h who marries a man of type i be
(5) V fijh = η
f
ij + ǫijh,
the above analysis produces I × J supply equations of the form:
(6) µfij =
eη
f
ij
eη
f
0j
µf0j.
The equilibrium output in the Choo-Siow model is a specification of µij for all 0 ≤ i ≤ I,
and all 0 ≤ j ≤ J . This output is obtained by requiring that supply balance demand:
µfij = µ
m
ij . Under this market-clearing hypothesis, we have the following equation. The
endogenous parts of the ηmij , η
f
ij , η
m
i0 , η
f
0j are eliminated upon adding them to arrive at
the definition of an exogenous1 aggregated gains variable πij associated to each observable
type of marriage:
(7) πij :=
ηmij + η
f
ij − ηmi0 − ηf0j
2
.
Using the market-clearing hypothesis, we may re-write the equilibrium condition µmij =
µfij =: µij in terms of the exogenous variable πij as follows:
(8)
µij√
µi0µ0j
= eπij .
Finally, letting Πij = e
πij , the equilibrium output is given by
(9)
µij√
µi0µ0j
= Πij .
The equilibrium conditions expressed in equation (9) are implicit. They give necessary
conditions for real numbers µij to be an output of the Choo-Siow model. However, they
are not sufficient; a secondary set of necessary conditions, population constraints, must
1See §7 below or Choo and Siow [7] for an explanation in terms of spousal transfers.
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also be satisfied. Let there be I types of men, and J types of women. The number of men
of type i is denoted mi, and the number of women of type j is denoted fj. The vector
whose ith component is mi, and whose (I + j)
th component is fj, is denoted by ν. Called
the population vector, it has (I + J) components and may also be denoted by [m | f ].
A specification (µij) 0≤i≤I
0≤j≤J
of the number of marriages and singles of each type is called a
marital distribution. The following population constraints must be satisfied by all marital
distributions, and are a consequence of the definitions:
µi0 +
J∑
j=1
µij = mi,(10)
µ0j +
I∑
i=1
µij = fj,(11)
µij ≥ 0.(12)
Several questions naturally arise. We call these questions the Choo-Siow inverse problem:
Problem (Choo-Siow inverse problem) Given a gains matrix Π = (Πij) and a pop-
ulation vector ν = [m | f ], does there exist a unique marital arrangement generating Π?
In other words, assuming the entries Πij to be non-negative and mi and fj to be strictly
positive, does exactly one matrix (µij) with non-negative entries exist
2 that satisfies (9)–
(12)? Furthermore, can the qualitative dependence of (µij) on the exogenous parameters
Π = (Πij) and ν = [νi] be described?
This problem is important for several reasons. First, the implicit conditions present
in equation (9) are the equilibrium outcome of a competitive market. There are not so
many realistic environments with finitely many agent types and many commodities which
are known to generate unique competitive equilibria — except possibly generically. While
there are generic uniqueness results for matching problems that can be reduced to convex
programing problems such as Monge-Kantorovich matching, e.g. [16] [4] [10] [11], the sto-
chastic heterogeneity prevents the equilibrium in our model from being formulated as such.
2Some readers have pointed out that for each realization of the randomness, balancing supply with
demand amounts to solving a linear program. In this setting, existence of an equilibrium (and its generic
uniqueness) are well-known [16] [4]. However, instead of balancing supply with demand for each realization,
the Choo-Siow model is based on balancing expected supply (4) with expected demand (6). Since the
expected supply (or demand) need not correspond to the actual supply (or demand) for any realization of
the randomness, existence of an equilibrium in the sense prescribed by Choo and Siow is not obvious. Unlike
a Nash equilibrium, in which no individuals have both the incentive and the opportunity to change their
marital status, in a Choo-Siow equilibrium this will only be true in some average sense. Never the less, the
notion has proved useful empirically, and might even be construed to reflect the metastability (as opposed
to stability) displayed by actual marriage markets. As simple examples show, such equilibria generally
correspond to interior points in the feasible polytope defined by the population constraints, hence cannot
be selected by the minimization of any linear function defined on this polytope. Nevertheless, we shall show
they do exist and are selected by the minimization of a specific strictly convex function introduced below.
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Instead, stochasticity restores uniqueness without the need for a genericity assumption in
our model — and indeed in the more general setting studied by Galichon and Salanie´ [15].
Second, an affirmative explicit solution to the Choo-Siow Inverse Problem makes the
Choo-Siow model useful in econometric analysis. The matrix Π is exogenous and unob-
served in data, but can be point-estimated from an observed marriage distribution. An
economic or social shock will affect the systematic utilities that agents of various types in-
cur by marrying agents of various others, and will therefore alter the value of Π. This effect
can be approximated to form an updated matrix of aggregated systematic parameters Π
′
.
Existence and uniqueness guarantee that there will be exactly one marriage distribution
that results from the shock, making the model predictive. In the same vein, demographers
are often interested in predicting how marriage distributions will change due to changing
demographics, i.e. changes in the population vector ν. Our closed form solution makes it
possible to compute the sign and in some cases the magnitude of such changes explicitly.
Finally, if the model can be shown to admit a unique distribution, the estimated pa-
rameters πij are an alternative characterization of the observed marriage distribution. The
recharacterization is useful because the parameters of the Choo-Siow model have a be-
havioural interpretation, and are not merely observed data.
2.3. Summary of progress and related literature. The related local uniqueness ques-
tion was resolved by Choo and Siow in [7]. However the issue of global uniqueness was
left open, and posed as an open problem in a subsequent working paper by Siow [23].
We resolve this question positively by introducing a variational principle and a change of
variables which allows us to exploit convexity. The question of existence of (µij) for all
Π = (eπij ) was addressed in a working paper of Choo, Seitz and Siow [6] by appealing
to the Tarski fixed point theorem; see also the related results of Fox [12] and Dagsvik
[8]. However the proofs there are long and involved, whereas the variational proof in the
present paper is simple and direct and follows from continuity and compactness by way of
an elementary estimate. Moreover, it leads to an explicit representation of the solution.
This allows us to rigorously confirm various desirable and intuitive features of Choo-Siow
matching, whose presence or absence might in principle be used as a test to refute the
validity of various alternative matching models. Among other results, we show for example
that an increase in the number of men of a given type increases the equilibrium transfer
paid by such men to their spouses, while also increasing the percentage of such men who
choose to remain single. See Theorem 2 below for related statements and more surprising
conclusions. Independently of us, Galichon and Salanie´ [14] [15] developed a variational
approach which extends the Choo-Siow model by allowing for randomness of much more
general form. From theoretical considerations, they derive a closed-form expression for a
strictly concave social welfare function governing competitive equilibria in their models,
and identities relating different sets of endogenous variables under consideration. This
gives an alternate approach to existence and uniqueness of equilibria in our setting as a
special case. Apart from its convex analytic nature, their approach is quite distinct from
ours, and leads to very different insights and interpretations.
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3. Precise Statement of Results
In the preceding remarks, the Choo-Siow inverse problem was phrased in terms of finding
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium µ given exogenous data Π and ν. As the name
suggests, it is also useful to think of this problem as one of inverting a function. From this
point of view, even though Π is exogenous, we may prefer instead to consider Π as the
image of a marriage distribution under a transformation that we seek to invert.
Remark 1 (Incomplete participation). From the market equilibrium point of view, the
fact that the left hand-side of (9) becomes infinite when µi0 or µ0j is equal to zero is
unproblematic. It means that for no finite value of the exogenous Π is sufficient to induce
all the representatives of some type to marry. However from the inverse problem point of
view, it is necessary to stipulate that µi0 and µ0j be strictly positive.
3.1. Preliminaries. Let us begin with a reformulation of the Choo-Siow inverse problem;
Siow attributes this reformulation to Angelo Melino. Let βi := µi0 and βI+j := µ0j denote
the number of unmarried men and women of types i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J respec-
tively. Since the gains matrix (9) can be used to express each component µij = βiβI+jΠij
of the marital distribution in terms of these new variables, the population constraints
(10)–(11) can be reduced to a system
β2i +
J∑
j=1
βiβI+jΠij − νi = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ I,
β2I+j +
I∑
i=1
βiβI+jΠij − νI+j = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ J.(13)
of (I + J) quadratic polynomials in the (I + J) variables {βk}k=1 counting the number of
umarried men and women of each type.
A solution to this system of equations is a vector of amplitudes β that has (I + J)
components. Abstractly, its components might be real, complex, or both. The Choo-Siow
Inverse Problem is equivalent to showing that the polynomial system (13) has a unique
solution with real positive amplitudes for all gains matrices Π and population vectors
ν = [m | f ] with positive components. The full marital distribution satisfying (9)–(12)
is then recovered by choosing µij = βiβI+jΠij. Our proof is variational. We construct a
functional E(β) with the property that β is a critical point of E — meaning a point where
E has zero derivative — if and only if β satisfies equation (13). We then show that E
has exactly one critical point in the positive orthant (R+)
I+J , and give a formula for this
critical point using the Legendre transform of a related function.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem, which solves the Choo-Siow
Inverse problem.
Theorem 1 (Existence, uniqueness, and explicit representation of a real positive solution).
If all the entries of Π = (Πij) are non-negative, and those of ν = [m | f ] are strictly
positive, then precisely one solution β of (13) lies in the positive orthant of RI+J . Indeed,
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the solution b := (log β1, . . . , log βI+J) satisfies b = (DH)
−1(ν) = DH∗(ν) where H(b) and
H∗(ν) are smooth strictly convex dual functions on RI+J defined by
(14) H(b) :=
1
2
I+J∑
k=1
e2bk +
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Πije
bi+bI+j
and
H∗(ν) := sup
b∈RI+J
〈ν, b〉 −H(b).(15)
Here 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product on RI+J .
Remark 2 (Unpopulated types). In case mi = 0 or fj = 0, we simply reformulate the
problem in fewer than I + J variables, corresponding only to the populated types. This
reformulation shows the conclusions of Theorem 1 extend also to population vectors ν =
[m | f ] whose entries are merely non-negative, instead of strictly positive.
Since each matrix (µij) with non-negative entries solving (9)–(12) corresponds to a
solution β of (13) having positive amplitudes βi =
√
µi0 and βI+j =
√
µ0j, this theorem
gives the sought characterization of (µij) by Π. Moreover, this characterization facilitates
computing variations in the marital arrangements in response to changes in the data (Π, ν):
Theorem 2 (Comparative statics). Let the unique solution to the Choo-Siow inverse prob-
lem with exogenous data Π and ν be given by β(Π, ν). Then (a) the percentage change of
singles β2k with respect to the population parameter νℓ turns out to define a symmetric and
positive definite matrix
(16) rkℓ :=
1
β2k
∂β2k
∂νℓ
;
here k, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , I+J}. This symmetric positive-definiteness implies, among other things,
the expected monotonicity rkk > 0, the unexpected symmetry rkℓ = rℓk, and more subtle
constraints relating these percentage rates of change and the corresponding substitution
effects such as |rkℓ| < √rkkrℓℓ.
(b) Additionally we can account for the sign, and in some cases bound the magnitude,
of each entry of the matrix R = (rkℓ). To avoid trivialities, assume no column or row of
Π vanishes, so no observable type of individual is compelled to remain single. Then,
(17) rkℓ < 0,
if k ∈ {1 . . . I} and ℓ ∈ {I + 1 . . . I + J} (or vice versa). Second, if k, ℓ ∈ {1 . . . I}, then
(18)
1
2
(β2k + νk)rkℓn > δkℓ :=
{
0 if k 6= ℓ
1 otherwise.
Similarly, (18) also holds if both k, ℓ ∈ {I + 1 . . . I + J}.
These qualitative comparative statics have a simple interpretation. Increased supply of
any type k of man coaxes more women into marriage (17) and decreases the number of
men who wish to marry. The last statement of the theorem says that this decrease is not
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merely due to the fact that there are more men. Rather, men of type ℓ 6= k who would have
chosen marriage under the old regime choose to be single after the shock (18). The following
corollary explains how the additional women are coaxed into marriage: it shows increased
competition among men leads to larger equilibrium transfers to their female spouses, as is
further explained in subsection §7. The corollary asserts not only monotonicity of utility
transferred by men of type i, but also of the percentage who choose to remain single, as a
function of their abundance in the population.
Corollary 3 (Utility transferred and non-participant fraction increase with abundance).
For all i ≤ I, j ≤ J , and k ≤ I + J , with the hypotheses and notation of Theorem 2,
∂
∂νi
(ηfij − ηmij ) > 0(19)
and
∂
∂νk
(β2k
νk
)
> 0.(20)
4. Derived statics and further conjectures
It is possible to express many quantities of interest in terms of the symmetric positive-
definite matrix R = (rij) from Theorem 2, whose entries encode the relative change in the
number of type i individuals who choose not to marry in response to a fluctuation in the
total number νj of type j individuals in the population. For example, in the Choo-Siow
model, the number of marriages µij of type i men to type j women is given by the geometric
mean (9) of the number of singles of the two given types times the corresponding entry in
the gains matrix: µij = Πij(µi0µ0j)
1/2 = Πijβiβj . Since Πij is exogenous, we immediately
obtain a formula
(21)
∂ log µij
∂νk
=
1
2
(rik + rk,I+j)
showing the relative change in the number of type (i, j) marriages caused by fluctuations
in the total population of type k individuals is just the average of the relative changes
rik := 2∂(log βi)/∂νk and rI+j,k in the numbers of unmarrieds of the corresponding types
i and j.
We may also consider fluctuations in the number of singles of type k in response to
changes in the exogenous gains parameters Πij when the population ν of each type of man
and woman is held fixed. In section 7.2, the implicit function theorem is used to derive
(22)
∂βk
∂Πij
= −βiβI+j(∂βk
∂νi
+
∂βk
∂νI+j
)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, and k ∈ {1, . . . , I + J}, or equivalently
(23)
∂ log βk
∂Πij
= − µij
2Πij
(rki + rk,I+j).
The equation (22) has an intuitive interpretation. An increase in the total systematic gains
to an (i, j) marriage (produced, for example, by an isolated increase in the value of type
j marriages to type i men, or an isolated decrease in the value of remaining single) has
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the same effect as decreasing the supply of the men or women of the respective types by a
proportionate amount, weighted by the geometric mean of the unmarried men and women
of type i and j.
Now Theorem 2 shows the the summands above to have opposite signs, so the sign of their
sum rki+rk,I+j will fluctuate according to market conditions. If k = i or k = I+j however,
it is natural to conjecture that this sum is positive, in which case (21) shows the the number
of type (i, j) marriages µij would be an increasing function of the population size of type
i (and independently, type j) individuals. Similarly (23) then asserts the number of type
i and j singles to be a decreasing function of the total gains Πij for type (i, j) marriages.
This conjecture amounts to requiring each positive diagonal entry rkk in the matrix R to
dominate each negative entry −rkℓ in its row or column — a plausible strengthening (whose
proof, alas, eludes us) of the claim r2kℓ ≤ rkkrℓℓ established in Theorem 2(a).
4.1. Summary of comparative statics. Before turning to the proof of the theorems
listed above, let us conclude by recapping our comparative statics.
• Increasing the men of a given type increases the number of singles of all male types,
and decreases the number of singles of all female types.
• Increasing the number of men of a given type increases the transfer they must pay
to any woman they marry (19).
• The percentage rate of change of unmarried men of type i due to increases in women
of type j is equal to the percentage rate of change of unmarried women of type j
due to increases in men of type i.
• The marital participation rate∑Jj=1 µijmi decreases with an increase in own type mi.
5. A New Variational Principle (Proof of Theorem 1)
5.1. Variational method: existence of a solution. Consider the function E : RI+J →
R ∪ {+∞}, defined as follows:
(24) E(β) :=
1
2
I+J∑
k=1
β2k +
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
ΠijβiβI+j −
I∑
k=1
νk log |βk|.
It diverges to +∞ on the coordinate hyperplanes where the βk vanish, but elsewhere is
smooth.
We differentiate and observe that β is a critical point of E if and only if (13) holds. Notice
strict positivity of the components of ν = [m | f ] implies the corresponding component of a
solution β to (13) is non-vanishing, hence no solutions occur on the coordinate hyperplanes
which separate the different orthants. In words, the critical points of E are precisely those
that satisfy the system of equations we wish to show has a unique real positive root. It
therefore suffices to show that E(β) has a unique real positive critical point; for then (13)
admits exactly one real positive solution. Let us show at least one such solution exists, by
showing E(β) has at least one critical point: namely, its minimum in the positive orthant.
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Claim 4 (Existence of a minimum). If all the entries of Π = (Πij) are non-negative, and
those of ν = [m | f ] are strictly positive, the function E(β) on the positive orthant defined
by (24) attains its minimum value.
Proof. Since E(β) is continuous, the claim will be established if we show the sublevel set
Bλ := {β ∈ (R+)I+J | E(β) ≤ λ} is compact for each λ ∈ R. Non-negativity of Πij
combines with positivity of νk, βk, and the inequality log βk ≤ βk − 1 to yield
E(β) ≥
I+J∑
k=1
1
2
β2k − νk(βk − 1)(25)
=
1
2
I+J∑
k=1
(βk − νk)2 − (νk − 1)2 + 1.(26)
It follows that Bλ is bounded away from infinity. Since E(β) diverges to +∞ on the coordi-
nate hyperplanes, it follows that Bλ is also bounded away from the coordinate hyperplanes
— hence compactly contained in the positive orthant. 
5.2. Uniqueness, convexity, and Legendre transforms. With this critical point char-
acterization of the solution in mind, let us observe for β ∈ RI+J in the positive orthant,
defining bk := log βk implies E(β) = H(b) − 〈ν, b〉, where H(b) is defined in (14). Since
the change of variables βk ∈ R+ 7−→ bk = log βk ∈ R is a diffeomorphism, it follows that
critical points of H(b) − 〈ν, b〉 in the whole space RI+J are in one-to-one correspondence
with critical points of E(β) in the positive orthant.
On the other hand, H(b) is manifestly convex, being a non-negative sum of convex
exponential functions of the real variables bk; in fact Πij ≥ 0 shows the Hessian D2H(b)
dominates what it would be in case Π = 0, namely the diagonal matrix with positive entries
diag[2e2b1 , . . . , 2e2bI+J ] along its diagonal. Thus H(b) is strictly convex throughout RI+J ,
and E(β) = H(b)−〈ν, b〉 can admit only one critical point β in the positive orthant — the
minimizer whose existence we have already shown. The solution β to (13) which we seek
therefore coincides with the unique point at which the maximum is attained.
This last fact means that b maximizes the right-hand side of the following equation:
H∗(ν) := sup
b∈RI+J
〈ν, b〉 −H(b)(27)
= sup
β∈(R+)I+J
−E(β).
The function H∗ defined pointwise by the above equation is the Legendre transform or
convex dual function of H; see Appendix B for details. It follows that the solution b
satisfies ν = DH(b). Thus b = DH∗(ν) by the duality of H and H∗. This provides an
explicit formula for b in terms of the derivative of H∗.
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6. Comparative Statics (Proof of Theorem 2)
6.1. Positive definiteness (a). Our representation of the solution in terms of the Le-
gendre transform of the convex function H can be used to obtain information about the
derivatives of the solutions with respect to the population parameters ν.
Suppose we wish to know how the number of marriages µij = ΠijβiβI+j of each type
(i, j) varies in response to slight changes in the population vector ν, assuming the gains
matrix Π remains fixed. This is easily computed from the percentage rate of change rkℓ in
the number β2k of unmarrieds of each type, which is given in terms of the Hessian of either
(14) or (15) by
(28) rkℓ :=
1
β2k
∂β2k
∂νℓ
= 2D2kℓH
∗(ν) = 2(D2H|−1(log β1,...,logβI+J))kℓ, 1 ≤ k, ℓ ≤ I + J.
To see that these equalities hold, observe that the solution β is the point where the
maximum (15) is attained. The Legendre transformH∗(ν) ofH defined by this maximum is
manifestly convex, and its smoothness is well-known to follow from the positive-definiteness
of D2H(b) > 0 as in Lemma 9. Moreover b = DH∗(DH(b)), whence the maximum (15) is
attained at b = DH∗(ν) and D2H(b)−1 = D2H∗(DH(b)) = D2H∗(ν) > 0. This positive
definiteness implies the first half of the Theorem 2.
6.2. Qualitative characterization of comparative statics (b). To complete our qual-
itative description of the substitution effects in this section, we apply the following theorem
from functional analysis to matrices T : Rn −→ Rn. We define the operator norm of such
a matrix by ‖T‖op := max
06=v∈Rn
|T (v)|/|v|, where |v| = 〈v, v〉1/2 denotes the Euclidean norm.
Theorem 5 (Neumann series for the resolvent of a linear contraction). If ‖T‖op <1 for
T : Rn −→ Rn, the operator (1− T )−1 exists and is equal to ∑∞k=0 T k.
Next, we consider the matrixD2H(b)|(log β1,...,log βI+J), and derive properties of its inverse,
whose entries give the various values of rkℓ/2. Differentiating the known functionH(b) twice
yields a positive-definite (I + J)× (I + J) matrix which can be factored into the form
(29) 2R−1 = D2H|b=(log β1,...,log βI+J) = ∆
(
∆I Π
ΠT ∆J
)
∆
where ∆ = diag[eb1 , . . . , ebI+J ] = diag[β], while ∆I and ∆J are I × I and J × J diagonal
submatrices whose diagonal entries are all larger than two:
(∆I)ii = 2 +
1
β2i
J∑
j=1
ΠijβiβI+j = 1 +
νi
β2i
,
(∆J)jj = 2 +
1
β2I+j
I∑
i=1
ΠijβiβI+j = 1 +
νI+j
β2I+j
.
Here we have used the fact that the values β are critical points and therefore satisfy the
first order conditions (13) to simplify these diagonal terms.
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There are determinant and inverse formulae for block matrices which assert [17] that
(30) det
(
∆I Π
ΠT ∆J
)
= det(∆I) det(∆J) det(1−∆I−1Π∆J−1ΠT ),
and
(31)
(
∆I Π
ΠT ∆J
)−1
=
(
(∆I −Π∆J−1ΠT )−1 −(∆I −Π∆J−1ΠT )−1Π∆J−1
−ΠT∆I−1(∆J −ΠT∆−1I Π)−1 (∆J −ΠT∆−1I Π)−1
)
.
The determinant (30) is positive by (29) and Theorem 1. We will now show that the
eigenvalues of the matrix A(s) = ∆I
−1sΠ∆J
−1sΠT , appearing in (30)–(31) are bounded
above by 1 and below by−1 for all values of s ∈ [0, 1]. This will have implications respecting
the signs of the entries of (31), whose (k, ℓ)th entry is in fact equal to βkβℓrkℓ/2 hence shares
the sign of the change (17)–(18) which we desire to estimate. Namely, it will allow us to
apply Theorem 5 to block entries such as (∆I −Π∆J−1ΠT )−1 = (1−A(1))−1∆I−1 in (31).
Let λmax(s) be the largest eigenvalue of A(s). Then, the smallest eigenvalue of (1−A(s))
is equal to (1−λmax(s)). We proceed by continuously deforming from s = 0 to s = 1: The
eigenvalues of (1−A(0)) are equal to 1, as A(0) is in fact equal to the zero matrix. Since
det(1−A(s)) > 0 for all s ∈ [0, 1], continuity of λmax(s) and the intermediate value theorem
imply that 1−λmax(s) > 0 for all s, so that λmax(1) < 1. Since no row of Π vanishes, A(s)
has positive entries whenever s > 0. The Perron-Frobenius theorem therefore implies that
any negative eigenvalue λ of A(1) is bounded by |λ| < λmax(1).
Since A has positive entries and ‖A‖op < 1, Theorem 5 indicates that the entries of
(1 − A)−1 are all positive — exceeding one on the diagonal. But βkβℓrkℓ/2 coincides
with the (k, ℓ)th entry of (1−A)−1diag[β21/(β21 + ν1), . . . , β2I /(β2I + νI)], giving the desired
inequalities (18) whenever k, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , I}. The signs of the remaining derivatives (17)–
(18) may be verified by applying the same technique to the three other submatrices present
in (31), thus completing the proof of Theorem 2(a)–(b).
7. Transfer utilities (Proof of Corollary 3 and subsequent remarks)
7.1. Varying the population vectors ν. Given a specification of Π and ν = [mi | fj ],
the Choo-Siow model predicts a unique vector β = [µi0 | µ0j ] of unmarrieds. Given a
fixed Π and a fixed β, the full marriage distribution can then be uniquely recovered. It is
therefore possible to view µ as a single valued (smooth) function of Π and ν. By Theorem 2,
the signs of rkℓ are independent of Π and ν and depend only on whether k ∈ {1, . . . , I}, or
k ∈ {I+1, . . . , I+J}, and likewise for ℓ. It is perhaps useful to visualize these comparative
statics as the entries of the matrix Dβ with Dℓβk :=
∂βk
∂νℓ
. Then, Dβ is a block matrix
that is positive in its upper-left and lower-right blocks, and negative in its upper-right and
lower-left blocks. Schematically, (17)–(18) yield
(32) Dβ =
(
+ −
− +
)
.
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Reverting back to the Choo-Siow notation for unmarrieds and population vectors, we
have for all k and ℓ:
(33)
∂µk0
∂mℓ
> 0,
∂µk0
∂fℓ
< 0,
∂µ0k
∂fℓ
> 0,
∂µ0k
∂mℓ
< 0.
These basic comparative statics yield qualitative information about other more complex
quantities of interest. As indicated following equation (7), the quantity ηmij +η
f
ij −ηmi0 −ηf0j
is exogenous, whereas the first two individual summands are separately endogenous and
determined within the model. In the original formulation of this model, present in [7], our
endogenous payoff ηmij = η˜
m
ij − τij is separated into a systematic return η˜mij presumed to be
exogenous, and a utility transfer τij from husband to wife, which is endogenous and set in
equilibrium. Similarly, ηfij = η˜
f
ij + τij.
In equilibrium (6), both of the following equations hold:
log(µij)− log(µ0j) = ηfij − ηf0j = η˜fij + τij − η˜f0j ,(34)
log(µij)− log(µi0) = ηmij − ηmi0 = η˜mij − τij − η˜mi0 ;(35)
there is no utility transferred by remaining single. Subtracting one from the other, we see
that:
(36) log(
µi0
µ0j
) = 2τij + cij ,
where cij = (η˜
f
ij − η˜f0j − η˜mij + η˜mi0 ) is exogenous.
We denote the differentiation operator ∂∂νk f by f˙ (suppressing the dependence on k).
Differentiating cij = (η
f
ij − 2τij − η˜f0j − ηmij + η˜mi0 ) and (36) yields:
∂
∂νk
(ηfij − ηmij ) = 2 ˙τij =
˙µi0
µi0
− ˙µ0j
µ0j
.
The inequalities (33) now determine the sign of ˙τij, which depends on the differentiation
variable νk. Since µ˙i0 and ˙µ0j have opposite signs, according to Theorem 2, we find
(37)
∂τij
∂mi
> 0,
which means the transfer of type i men to each type of spouse must increase in response
to an isolated increase in the population of men of type i. This is expected because an
increase in the number of type i men introduces additional competition for each type of
women, due to the smearing present in the model. To decrease the number of type i
men demanding marriage to a particular type of woman to a level that permits one-to-one
matching requires an increase in the transfer to crowd out some men.
While in principle the men might re-distribute so that the proportion of married men
remains the same, our next computation shows this is not the case. We consider the marital
participation rate of type k individuals, or rather the non-participation rate sk(ν) := β
2
k/νk,
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defined as the proportion of individuals who choose not to marry. Differentiation yields
∂sk
∂νk
=
β2k
ν2k
(
νkrkk − 1
)
>
β2k
ν2k
(νk − β2k
νk + β
2
k
)
,
according to (18). But this is manifestly positive since the number β2k of singles of type k
cannot exceed the total number νk of type k individuals. This means, for example, that an
increase in the total population of type k men increases the percentage of type k men who
choose to remain unmarried, given a fixed population of women and men of other types
(and assuming, as always, that the exogenous gains matrix Π remains fixed). It concludes
the proof of Corollary 3.
7.2. Varying the gains data Π (Proof of (22)-(23)). The population vector ν is one
variable of interest. However the function β also depends on the gains parameters Πij .
The complete derivative D(ν,Π)β = [Dνβ | DΠβ] is an (I + J) × (IJ + I + J) matrix. As
such there are linear dependencies among its rows and columns. Since the matrix Dνβ
is invertible, its columns are linearly independent and form a basis of the column space.
Hence, the remaining columns of the complete derivative can be expressed using linear
combinations of them. The implicit function theorem applied to this problem turns out to
yield the simple linear relationship (22):
(38)
∂βk
∂Πij
= −βiβI+j(∂βk
∂νi
+
∂βk
∂νI+j
)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, and k ∈ {1, . . . , I + J}.
Equilibrium (13) coincides with vanishing of the function F (β, ν,Π) : R(I+J)+(I+J)+(IJ) →
RI+J defined by
Fi(ν,Π) = β
2
i +
J∑
j=1
βiβI+jΠij − νi, 1 ≤ i ≤ I
Fj(ν,Π) = β
2
I+j +
I∑
i=1
βiβI+jΠij − νI+j, 1 ≤ j ≤ J.(39)
The implicit function theorem stipulates that if the derivative DβF |β0,ν0,Π0 is invertible,
there is a small neighbourhood around (β0, ν0,Π0) inside which for each (ν,Π) there is a
unique β satisfying equation (13), and further that β depends smoothly on (ν,Π). The
implicit function theorem also provides a formula for the derivative of the implicit function
β(ν,Π). It is obtained by applying the chain-rule to F (β(ν,Π), ν,Π):
(40) [Dνβ | DΠβ]ν0,Π0 = −[DβF ]−1[DνF | DΠF ]β0,ν0,Π0 .
Since ∂Fk∂νℓ = −δkℓ, and
∂Fℓ
∂Πij
= βiβI+j(δiℓ + δI+j,ℓ), the first part of the preceding formula
yields [DβF ]
−1 = Dνβ, and the second part then implies (38). Theorem 2 shows Dνβ is
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invertible, so the hypotheses of the implicit function theorem are globally satisfied and our
calculations are valid. This concludes the proof of (22)-(23).
Appendix A. Derivation of the preference probabilities
The random variable present in the definition of male and female utility is the Gumbel
extreme value distribution, introduced to the economics literature by McFadden [19]:
Definition 6 (Gumbel distribution). A random variable ǫ is Gumbel if it has cumulative
distribution function F (ǫ) = exp(− exp(−ǫ)).
Here Pr(ǫ < x) = F (x) gives the probability that the realization of this random variable
takes a value less x ∈ R. The corresponding density function is F ′(x) = f(x) = exp(−(x+
exp(−x)). The mean of ǫ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant, which is approximately equal
to γ = 0.57 . . .. Its variance is equal to π
2
6 .
We now use this distribution to derive the discrete probability distribution (2).
Lemma 7. Suppose σ > 0 and ηij ∈ R are constants, while for each choice of j =
0, . . . , J, the ǫijg are independent identically distributed random variables with the Gumbel
distribution. Then
(41) Pr(ηij + ǫijg = max
0≤k≤J
ηik + ǫikg) =
exp(
ηij
σ )∑J
k=0 exp(
ηik
σ )
.
Proof. It costs no generality to assume σ = 1. Then
(42) P := Pr(ηij + ǫijg ≥ ηik + ǫikg∀k) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dǫ F ′(ǫ)Πk 6=jF (ηij + ǫ− ηik).
This formula follows from Bayes’ rule for conditional probability, and independence of the
various random variables involved. Substituting in the explicit formula for the Gumbel
distribution from Definition 6 yields
(43) P =
∫ ∞
−∞
dǫ exp(−(ǫ+ exp (−ǫ))Πk 6=j exp(− exp(ηik − ηij − ǫ)).
We make a change of variables by setting t = exp(−ǫ), so dǫ=−dt/t. Evaluating the
integral in the new variables yields
P =
∫ ∞
0
dt exp(−t)Πk 6=j exp(−t exp(ηik − ηij))
=
∫ ∞
0
dt exp(−t
J∑
k=0
exp(ηik − ηij))
=
1∑J
k=0 exp(ηik − ηij)
=
exp(ηij)∑J
k=0 exp(ηik)
as desired. 
UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS IN THE MARRIAGE MARKET 19
Corollary 8 (Expected marital preferences by observed types). Suppose a man with ob-
servable type i and (unobservable) specific identity g derives utility V mijg = η
m
ij + σǫijg from
being married to a woman of observable type j, independent of her specific identity. If
σ > 0, ηmij ∈ R and ǫijg are as in Lemma 7, then the probability he prefers a woman of
type j to all other alternatives in {0, 1, . . . , J} is given by (2).
Remark 3 (The Boltzmann / Gibbs distribution). The probabilities which appear in (2)
and (41) take the form of the Boltzmann or Gibbs distributions from statistical physics,
in which the deterministic component ηmij of the utility derived plays the role of the energy
associated with marital state j, while the strength σ of the random component plays the role
of the physical temperature. This connection is also discussed by Galichon and Salanie´ [14]
[15].
Appendix B. The Legendre Transform
Here some well-known results pertaining to convexity and the Legendre transform are
recalled. Let F : Rn → R be a twice continuously differentiable function; F is convex if
Hess(F) := D2F ≥ 0, and strictly convex if the line segment connecting any two points on
the graph of F lies above the graph. The Legendre transform or convex dual function to
F (p) is denoted F ∗() and defined pointwise by:
(44) F ∗(q) = sup
p∈Rn
{q · p− F (p)}.
Since the supremum of affine functions is convex, it is clear that F ∗(q) is a convex function.
Additionally, the following duality result is true:
Lemma 9 (Legendre duality). Let F ∈ C2 be strongly convex on Rn, meaning Hess(F ) >
0. Then F ∗ is also twice continuously differentiable. Further, if q = DF (p), then p=DF ∗(q).
References
[1] Gary Becker. A theory of marriage, Part I. Journal of Political Economy 81 (1973) 813–846.
[2] Steven Berry and Peter Reiss. Empirical models of entry and market structure, chapter for Volume III
of the Handbook of Industrial Organization, edited by Mark Armstrong and Robert Porter. New York:
North Holland, 2007.
[3] Loren Brandt, Aloysius Siow and Carl Vogel. Large shocks and small changes in the marriage market
for famine born cohorts in China. University of Toronto Working Paper, 2008.
[4] Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Robert J. McCann and Lars Nesheim. Hedonic price equilibria, stable match-
ing, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness. Economic Theory 42 (2010) 317–
354.
[5] Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Bernard Selanie´ and Yoram Weiss. Assortative matching on the marriage
market: A structural investigation. In process.
[6] Eugene Choo, Shannon Seitz and Aloysius Siow. Marriage matching, risk sharing, and spousal labour
supplies. University of Toronto Working Paper, 2008.
[7] Eugene Choo and Aloysius Siow. Who marries whom and why. Journal of Political Economy 114
(2006) 175–201.
[8] John K. Dagsvik. Aggregation in matching markets. International Economic Review 41 (2000) 27–57.
20 COLIN DECKER, ELLIOTT H. LIEB, ROBERT J. MCCANN, AND BENJAMIN K. STEPHENS
[9] Colin Decker.When do Systematic Gains Uniquely Determine the Number of Marriages between Differ-
ent Types in the Choo-Siow Marriage Matching Model? Sufficient Conditions for a Unique Equilibrium.
University of Toronto MSc. Thesis, 2010.
[10] Ivar Ekeland. Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimen-
sional types. Economic Theory 42 (2010) 275–315.
[11] Alessio Figalli and Young-Heon Kim and Robert J. McCann. When is multidimensional screening a
convex program? Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 454-478.
[12] Jeremy T. Fox. Estimating matching games with transfers. University of Chicago working paper, 2009.
[13] Alfred Galichon. Discussion of A. Siow’s ‘Testing Becker’s theory of positive assortative matching’.
Milton Friedman Institute, University of Chicago. February 28, 2009.
[14] Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salanie´. Matching with trade-offs: Revealed preferences over competing
characteristics. Working paper, 2009.
[15] Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salanie´. Cupid’s invisible hand: social surplus and identification in
matching models. Working paper, 2011.
[16] Neil E. Gretsky, Joseph M. Ostroy and William R. Zame. The nonatomic assignment model. Economic
Theory 2 (1992) 103–127.
[17] Roger A. Horn and Charles R. Johnson. Matrix Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985.
[18] Felix Kuber and Karl Schmedders. Competitive equilibria in semi-algebraic economies. Penn Institute
for Economic Research working paper, 2007.
[19] Daniel McFadden. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior, in Frontiers in Economet-
rics, edited by Paul Zarembka, New York: Academic Press, 1974.
[20] Robert Pollack. Two-sex population models and classical stable population theory. In Convergent
Issues in Genetics and Demography, edited by Julian Adams et al., 317-33. New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990.
[21] John H. Pollard. Modelling the interaction between the sexes. Mathematical and Computer Modelling
26 (1997) 11–24.
[22] Aloysius Siow. Testing Becker’s theory of positive assortative matching. Working paper 356, University
of Toronto Department of Economics, 2009.
[23] Aloysius Siow. How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework. Canadian Journal of
Economics, 41 (2008) 1121–1155.
Department of Mathematics, University of Toronto, Toronto Ontario Canada M5S 2E4
colin.decker@utoronto.ca Current address: SunLife Financial, 150 King Street West Toronto
Ontario Canada M5H 3T9 ATTN:TK11 Corporate Risk Management
Departments of Mathematics and Physics, Jadwin Hall, Princeton University, P.O. Box
708, Princeton, NJ 08542, USA lieb@math.princeton.edu
Corresponding author: Department of Mathematics, University of Toronto, Toronto
Ontario Canada M5S 2E4 mccann@math.toronto.edu
Department of Mathematics, University of Toronto, Toronto Ontario Canada M5S 2E4
stephens@math.toronto.edu. Current address: Department of Mathematics, University of
Washington, Seattle Washington USA 98195-4350 benstph@math.washington.edu
